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Introduction
There is a general academic and policy concern in the UK about the way the financial system is operating; specifically, that investor disengagement and their short-term goals are damaging the economic health of the country (Plender, 2011; The Kay Review, 2012) .There is now a formal agreement among policy-makers that both more accountability within the investment chain and more effective investor engagement are needed to remedy the situation (Stewardship Code, 2010 , The Kay Review, 2012 . Pension funds in particular have been regarded for over a decade as best suited to act as long-term and engaged investors because they tend to have longterm and predictable investment horizons, and therefore they can provide 'patient capital' (Haldane, 2010; Hawley and Williams, 2000; Myners, Report, 2001; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Davis, et. al, 2006; Martin, et al, 2007; The Stewardship Code, 2010; The Kay Review, 2012 ). Yet, the evidence of pension fund engagement is mixed.
Our research aims to shed more light on what characterises the distinction between engaged and disengaged pension funds. More specifically, how pension fund practitioners talk about engagement and disengagement over time. We start with a review of the literature, which highlights the paradoxical nature of institutional ownership without a commitment and mixed evidence on pension fund engagement vis-à-vis portfolio companies. To help explain why such variations in behaviour may exist, we frame our study in the construct of vocabularies of motive, sense-making and organisational enactment (Mills, 1940; Weick, 1969) , combining this with the notion of temporality (Bluedorn and Standfier, 2006; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012) .
This novel analytical lens informs our methodology and data analysis, which we outline in our research design. By using the examples of pension fund engagement 3 and disengagement, we reveal the existence of different accounts and vocabularies of motive within pension fund investment practices. These vocabularies of motive are durable and also accompanied with distinctly different temporal perspectives. We term these as 'engaged' and 'disengaged' vocabularies. Disengaged vocabulary included common internal and external accounts, which were referred to as significant constraints to engagement. In contrast, engaged vocabulary included a range of external and internal accounts described as enablers of engagement. We also found that pension fund practitioners who used a disengaged vocabulary had a more negative perception of the present in comparison to the past, which led them to describe future as more uncertain and short-term. Engaged vocabulary consisted of a narrative of positive gradual changes in the industry over time, which was associated to a longer-term and sustainable future. In so doing, we present rich and novel empirical examples of distinct vocabularies and propose that they represent an important linchpin for understanding how vocabularies shape institutional behaviour.
We highlight the need to develop a more coherent and common understanding of how vocabularies and temporal perspectives work, particularly as our findings highlight a tension between a seeming relationship between vocabularies and accounts and future pension fund behaviour vis-à-vis investee corporations. We conclude by considering the significance of our findings with respect to academic and current policy debates, offering some implications for further research.
Ownership without Commitment: Mixed Evidence of Pension Fund Engagement
Since Berle and Means (1932) examined the implications of the separation of ownership and control, the monitoring and disciplining role of institutional investors has been considered to be an important governance mechanism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . In his seminal work, Hirschman (1970) identified the investor/company 4 relationship within the 'exit' or 'voice' framework, where investors either sell the shares ('exit') if they are dissatisfied, or express concerns to management though 'voice' or engagement. However, the empirical evidence investigating this relationship is decidedly mixed (Bainbridge, 2003; Dalton, et. al., 2007; Tilba, 2011) .
Most recent academic reviews of the current state of shareholder activism literature suggest that the research on shareholder engagement (both financial and social) offers conflicting perspectives on this topic (Goranova and Ryan, 2014; McNulty and Nordberg, 2016) .
Paradoxically, Davis (2008) and Jackson (2008) observe that although institutional investors seem to be increasing in both size and the concentration of their stakes, this concentrated ownership is generally liquid and without commitment, focusing on generating short-term investment returns. This is reflected in the trend towards increased stock turnover and shorter average stock-holding periods (Tomorrow's Owners, 2008; Ownership Commission, 2012) . For example, in the UK institutional investors' portfolio turnover reached 56% (Jackson, 2008) , while the average duration of equity holding has fallen from five years in the 1960s to just over seven months in 2009 (Haldane, 2010) .
Pension funds, it is argued, are best suited to act as long-term and engaged investors because they tend to have long-term and predictable investment horizons (Hawley and Williams, 2000; Ryan and Schneider, 2002; Davis, et. al, 2006; Martin, et al, 2007; The Stewardship Code, 2010; The Kay Review, 2012 ). Yet, there are only a few UK (mostly quantitative) studies that examine pension funds in relation to corporate governance. The evidence is also conflicting. On the one hand, most prominent (US) studies on shareholder activism have centred around California Public Employees Retirement System's (CalPERS) activism on target firm governance 5 structure, shareholder wealth and performance (Smith, 1996; Hebb, 2006; Barber, 2007; Choi and Fisch, 2008) . In the UK, Clark and Hebb (2004) have observed that pension funds use their influence to increase managerial accountability and corporate transparency in order to raise standards of corporate behaviour. A survey of more than 250 pension funds in fifteen European countries by Sievänen, et al (2013) also demonstrates that large and small pension funds are active in responsible investment.
However, this evidence is contrasted with studies that regard pension funds as inefficient monitors (Bushee, 1998; Duggal, 1999; Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling 1996; Romano, 2000, Tilba and McNulty, 2013) . Bushee (1998) characterises pension funds as 'quasi-indexers', arguing that they exacerbate incentives for myopic investment behaviour because their fragmented and passive ownership precludes them from gathering important company information, disincentivizing the monitoring of managers. A number of scholars have consistently doubted pension fund ability and inclination to act as principals and influence investee companies (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Webb, et. al. 2003; Hellman, 2005; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Conyon and Sadler, 2010) . Similarly, Goergen and Renneboog (2002) argued that institutional investors in the UK are mostly passive.
Pensions industry reports also present contrasting evidence. For example, the latest report by ShareAction on the actual voting practices by asset managers (2015) reveals a tendency by some managers to vote in favour of company management's recommendations even when there was a case to vote against them. The actual uptake of stewardship by institutional investors remains scant. This is contrasted with the NAPF Engagement Survey (2014), according to which 94% agreed that institutional investors (including pension funds) have stewardship responsibilities which include engaging with companies and voting shares.
6
This mixed evidence suggests a gap in our understanding about different qualitative influences that may be at play in informing institutional behaviour. For example, Hendry, et. al. (2004; 2006; 2007) were exploring different motivations behind investor engagement. Similarly, Tilba and McNulty (2013) highlight the need to attend to the practices, meanings and motives that underpin investment management by institutions. We argue that there is a need to shed new light on pension fund investment strategies using novel empirical and qualitative explanations of the distinction between engaged and disengaged pension funds. More specifically, we need to understand how pension fund practitioners talk about their investment practises and what accounts they give about engagement and disengagement. We draw on vocabularies of motive, sense-making and organisational enactment (Mills, 1940; Weick, 1969) and use this perspective with particular attention to temporality as an analytical lens to explore our research question and interpret the data.
Practical Reasoning, Vocabularies of Motive and Organizational Enactment
Organizational scholars have long researched vocabularies to understand institutional practices and with the rise of research on language, meaning and discourse, these theoretical frameworks have been helping advance the work on institutional logic as novel extension for organizational research and practice. A large part of this work has been done by scholars who propose that vocabularies are instrumental in the social construction of meaning, organizing practices and institutions (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012 ).
An interest in vocabularies is longstanding and has been most influenced by the work of Kenneth Burke and C. Wright Mills who provided an integrated and developed theory of vocabularies. In his seminal work on 'Situated Actions and 7 Motive', Mills (1940) suggests that when an agent is articulating motives, he is not merely describing his experienced social action, but also influencing others and himself. Broadly, Mills suggests that the ways in which people talk about their motives is dependent on social contexts. In other words, the association with a subcultural group can have an impact on an individual's decisions and behavior (Mills, 1940) . Similarly, a prominent American organizational theorist Karl Weick uses the term enactment to denote the idea that certain phenomena, for example, organizations or certain behaviors and human actions, are created or enacted by being discussed. Weick theorizes that by constructing, objectifying and enacting their thoughts, people literally create their own reality and constraints (1969) .
Vocabularies of
Although talk is the fundamental material of human relation, the 'sociology of talk' (Scott and Lyman, 1968) remains underdeveloped in management and corporate governance research.
According to Scott and Lyman (1968) , the central feature of talk is giving and receiving of accounts or statements made to explain untoward behavior, bridging the gap between expectations and actions. The explanations of the identification of intentions, purposes and choices of actions are revealed to us through the accounts that practitioners give of their daily practices. By an account Scott and Lyman (1968) mean 'a statement made by a social actor to explain unanticipated or untoward behavior -whether that behavior is his own or that of others, and whether that proximate cause for the statement arises from the actor himself or form someone else' (p. 46). Accounts thus reflect 'socially approved vocabularies which neutralize an act or its consequences when one or both are called into question' (Scott and Lyman, 1968: 46-51) .
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As actions contain some 'mental element', the accounts of actions (which can be excuses or justifications) will have components of 'knowledge' and 'will' (Scott and Lyman, 1968) . Following from this logic, an individual might excuse himself from responsibility, using claims that certain information was unavailable to him, and if it had been, his behavior would have been different. Both knowledge and will can be impaired under certain conditions, with mitigated responsibility as a direct consequence. Such a pattern of behavior is also referred to as 'culturally-established sense-making -or "interpretative repertoires"' (Potter & Wetherell 1987; 149, Wetherell and Potter, 1988; 171) . In social interaction an individual will learn a 'repertoire' of situations or backgrounds, as well as corresponding appropriate accounts which are acceptable to others. In other words, vocabularies help establish a common ground, a shared knowledge among social actors both within and across organizations that is essential for coordinated social action (Bechky, 2003; Cramton, 2001) . Following this perspective, a key research objective would be to understand how social actors themselves handle internal and external explanations of action as part of their discursive practice (Wetherell, 2005) . Furthermore, because meaning is grounded in experience it is important to discuss examples of specific practices, activities, events or relationships that are collectively experienced and conventionally referred to (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012) .
The research drawing on vocabularies is wide ranging from research on rhetoric (Sillince, 2005; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005) ; culture (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Mills, 1939) and institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) . In corporate governance Nordberg and McNulty (2013) observe a shifting discourse in the codification within UK away from board structures, composition and procedures in Cadbury towards 'behaviour', as the code seeks to improve board effectiveness as a 9 mechanism of governance. Aspara, et. al. (2014) theorized about self-reinforcing processes and biases within organizations when they investigated the causes for corporate short-termism. Most recently, Whittle and Mueller (2015) have used similar ideas when they examined the testimonies of leaders of British banks during a UK public inquiry into the financial crisis. They have identified competing interpretative repertoires of agency and structure that the UK bankers used to handle accountability, and particularly their roles in the events leading up to the collapse of the banks.
All in all, scholars who use discourse analysis tend to focus on the delivery of ideas as a form of strategic action but only rarely do they explore actors' vocabularies and the relations of words to examples (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012) . In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by using the empirical examples of pension fund engagement and disengagement to examine the accounts (both historic and present) used by participants in their daily work practices, which form vocabularies in relation to these examples.
On Temporality
Time has played only a supporting role in prior organization and management studies. Understanding temporality or the 'uses of the past' by managers, organisations and industries represents an important and very interesting dimension of our study. Previous management research and theory tended to understand history as 'organisation's history' (Nelson and Winter, 1982) or histories of industries or populations of firms as 'given' (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) . In contrast, the 'uses of the past' approach emphasizes the significance of interpretations of the past and their relationship to how organizational actors experience the present and set expectations 10 for the future. Thus, it represents a novel lens from which to understand a range of phenomena related to organization and management (Mads, et al, 2016) .
Time is a basic dimension of organizations and differences in views and assumptions about time shaping organisational culture (Schein, 1983) and norms of organisational behaviour (Doob, 1971) . Temporal dimensions of organizations include temporal orientation (i.e. past, present and future), trade-offs related to work pace and awareness of time use (Schriber and Gutek, 1987) . A perception of time that considers time cycles adds temporal depth to organizational image (Schriber, 1985) .
Using the notion of 'temporal imagination', Bluedorn and Standfier (2006) 
Research Design and Methodology
This paper has been written as part of a much larger qualitative study into UK pension funds' investment practices and corporate engagement. This study was based on 35 interviews with pension fund trustees, executives, investment officers and 11 financial intermediaries, documentary analysis and observations of four pension fund investment meetings. For this paper, of particular significance were the meanings and actions that 35 key decision-makers assigned to their investment management practices.
Sampling
The UK pension fund industry is remarkably concentrated, with a relatively small proportion of big pension funds and a long 'tail' of small schemes. There are only four pension funds in the whole population with assets under management over £20 billion. We categorize pension funds with assets under management between £10 and £20 billion as 'large'; funds between £5 and £10 billion as 'medium'; and funds with assets under management between £2 and £5 billion as 'small' funds within the UK Top 100 listing. We used theoretical sampling (Shah and Corley, 2006) to identify the funds to study and whom to interview. The literature on pension fund governance suggests that pension fund context, size of assets, maturity, internal investment management capabilities, liquidity requirements, as well as pension fund type (e.g., occupational or local authority fund), are all relevant when determining the approach to investment management, and ultimately the fund's relationship with investee corporations. These pension fund characteristics served as initial sample criteria which informed the identification of the pension funds in two phases (detailed in Appendix A). Apart from these fund characteristics, we were also guided by the assumption that larger (and more internally resourced) pension funds would be better positioned to engage with portfolio companies (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Tilba and McNulty, 2013) . We also considered that the dominant arrangement of pension fund investment management is delegation through investment experts (Clark, 2000; Tilba and McNulty, 2013) . However, given the examples of collective engagement of smaller local authority funds through the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF), we allowed that medium and small size pension funds with delegated investment management might also be in a position to exert influence. As a result, our sample was diverse enough to represent all of these characteristics.
Data Collection
Data collection and analysis occurred in two stages. The first stage was 
Data Analysis
We used a grounded theory approach (Glasser and Strauss, 1960) where we iteratively aimed to build theory by looking into how meanings and concepts are constructed. Grounded in Mills' (1940) logic, we aimed to understand 'vocabularies of motives' of pensions practitioners as situated in time. Although we might not know the true motivations of the respondents, we could learn more about interviewees' subjective perceptions of their internal world and detect clues into the way they think about how their world works. We take a sociological view here that it is the internal subjective reality that can determine how interviewees act in their external world. As the intent was to capture the rhetoric around investment, we interviewed respondents who were involved in pension fund management and making strategic investment decisions.
During the first stage of data analysis (completed in 2010), a distinct and novel theme emerged: all interviewees referred to a number of factors such as their organisational roles and changing context, which they considered to have shaped their approach to investment strategy. This prompted a second round of data analysis between June 2013 and February 2014. As part of the peer review process, we revisited the data again to take a more nuanced view of time. Data analysis was inductive and interpretative, using content analysis to analyse the interview transcripts. To warrant the robustness of this analysis, we used the techniques similar to those used by Eisenhardt, (1989) , Dacin, et. al. (2010); Creed, et. al. (2010) and Tilba and McNulty (2013) , which consisted of four steps.
In the first step of the analysis, interview transcripts were entered in NVivo as text files and coded on the basis of 'in vivo' words. These comprised descriptions offered by interviewees, all revolving around pension fund investment practices and examples of engagement and disengagement. Distinct themes relating to organisational roles and changing context were identified and also grouped based on the engaged or disengaged stance, forming the first-order codes.
In the second step, second-order codes were identified. For example, comments on the first order code such as 'organisational roles' could be distinguished into 'tree nodes' with statements about fiduciary responsibilities of trustees and their expertise. Trustees' statements about contextual factors were grouped into nodes such as 'economic recession and unstable financial markets', 'increased employer involvement', 'increased human longevity' and 'progressing pension fund maturity'.
The second-order codes were then refined through triangulation of interviews, with the notes taken during round-table discussions during the consultation (Lincoln and Guba, 1985) . This was a recursive rather than a linear process, with analysis moving iteratively between the first-and second-order codes, and patterns in the data emerging into conceptual themes (Eisenhardt, 1989; Dacin, et. al., 2010) . This data was then revisited with a more nuanced view of time. For example, the node 'changing context' was further grouped into two distinct temporal perspectives associated with 'engaged' and 'disengaged' examples.
In the third step, the emerging conceptual themes were organized into the overarching themes that inform our main findings and theoretical reflections. To ensure the credibility of our analysis (Shah and Corley, 2006) , throughout the process the authors discussed coding, cross-referencing and emerging themes. NVivo also allowed the interview content to be analysed more systematically. This data analysis enabled us to develop two broad vocabularies of motives that pension fund trustees and managers use to explain their own investment practice, alongside temporal perspectives. We term these as 'engaged' and 'disengaged' vocabularies and map them as examples A and B illustrated in Figure 1 .
Research Findings
Empirically, we reveal the existence of different accounts and vocabularies of motive within pension fund investment practices. These vocabularies of motive are durable and also accompanied with distinctly different temporal perspectives There were also references to internal accounts such as trustee fiduciary duty, internal resources and expertise. However, these were considered as enablers of engagement, alongside external public pressure for more accountability and engagement.
We also found that distinct temporal perspectives accompanies engaged and disengaged vocabularies. Group A created a distinct narrative of stable funding and pension fund's environment being 'simple' and 'uncomplicated' in the past, but becoming 'volatile' and 'overly complex' in the present, leading to an 'uncertain'
future. In contrast, group B used a more positive narrative, describing gradual pension industry changes from non-engagement in the past to more active engagement by some pension funds in the present, and ultimately connecting this to a more sustainable future. We elaborate on these findings in more detail next, starting with interviewees accounts in the Disengaged Vocabulary.
Group A Disengaged Vocabulary
Internal Accounts therefore it was not seen as a prudent way of fulfilling a trustee's duty to grow a pension fund. The fund managers said that they exercised discipline over the management of the investee companies by exiting or selling the shares, rather than engaging.
Regulator, 2010). According to the Trustee Act 2000, trustees are also given power to invest assets in a way that produces an income or return on capital.
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Expertise within trustee boards. A majority of trustees and pension fund managers also referred to a lack of investment expertise on their boards and the subsequent outsourcing from an increasingly complex pensions environment as another reason why they did not engage with their investee companies. Many explained that although trustees are responsible for investment strategy, by law they are not required to be investment experts. Instead, they are required to take appropriate investment advice to help formulate and implement that strategy. Therefore, respondents also shifted their individual responsibility for (dis)engagement by attributing it to an increase in the availability of financial intermediation in a form of investment consultants and other experts.
Relationship with the Employer. In conversations about the challenges and barriers towards investor engagement, interviewees also described the need to maintain a good relationship with the employer as a constraint. Nearly all interviewees of occupational pension funds related financial well-being of a pension fund to the financial health of their employer. Trustees suggested that it is part of their responsibility to maintain a healthy relationship with the employer and expressed the view that they did not want to engage on any particular corporate governance issue because that might damage the reputation of their employer. Quotes 5, 6 and 7 exemplify this perception. We find that in handling the questions of engagement trustees of large and potentially powerful pension funds seem to make a rational choice and deliberately remain distant because it 'makes more sense' for them to do so. Close ties with the sponsor are said to put pressure on trustees and managers to maintain the status quo with the company and 'not rock the boat'. Accordingly, the involvement with investee companies was said to be minimal.
External Accounts
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Unstable financial markets. All interviewees perceived that they were operating in an environment characterized by unstable and complex financial markets, a situation which made it difficult for them to engage with investee corporations because they were more preoccupied with generating investment returns from their investment portfolios. Respondents expressed views that economic and financial instability have further worsened pension schemes' funding and increased the financial vulnerability of pension funds, putting more pressure on schemes to look for other means and investment tools to improve funding. Most interviewees referred to the falls in productivity, corporate insolvency risks and reduced levels of employer contributions as key external drivers shaping their investment strategy. In the context of local authority pension funds, there was a common perception that the worsening economic climate had put pension funds in a huge financial strain, precluding trustees from focusing on stewardship and engagement. Quotes 12 and 13 highlight this common perception.
Increasing human longevity was another factor that interviewees commonly referred to when they reflected on their investment practices. Scientific data show that increasing life expectancy rose both in men and women: a 65-year-old man retiring today will, on average, live to 89 (The Economist, February 23-29, 2008) . Over a third of interviewees perceived longevity as one of the largest pension risks, after the investment risk impacting on their investment strategy. According to most respondents, operating in a world where people live longer would meant that pensions have to be paid out over longer periods of time, but at similar pension contribution levels. According to The Purple Book (2009), an increase in human longevity by two years had increased schemes' liabilities by around £51.4 billion, or 5.2% of liabilities.
While reflecting on the current conditions, the respondents emphasized that the main 20 challenge of increased longevity relates to maintaining scheme funding and making pensions affordable (Quote 10). Crucially, interviewees perceived that increased longevity and the associated increase in pension liabilities put pressure on trustees to focus more on generating investment returns within their investment fund manager mandates, rather than corporate governance matters.
Pension fund maturity. The more mature a fund is, the less contributions it receives from its working members and the more benefits it needs to pay out to the retired members. The common understanding amongst practitioners was that the more mature pension funds face more pressing liquidity demands and financial needs. Over 80% of pension funds in the sample were mature or maturing pension funds.
Subsequently, trustees and pensions managers explained that because they run maturing funds, their investment priority was to generate more returns on their investments and diversify their investment portfolio to match pension liability profiles more closely. (Quote 11). The language of 'generating investment returns' in order to 'pay out pensions now as opposed to later' was used throughout all discussions, particularly when practitioners accounted for their reasons behind disengagement.
Temporal Perspective
In our data, we found that trustees and pension fund managers who broadly used disengaged vocabulary shared a similar temporal perspective of the pension fund industry being 'secure' in the past, but then becoming increasingly 'complex' and 'pressured' in the present. Such use of the past seems to have created a narrow vision of the uncertain future, where trustees ought to be thinking of 'the bottom line'.
From surpluses to deficits. Alongside the interviewees' references to external socioeconomic 'reasons' , they have also contextualised it using a rhetoric of pension fund 21 finances suffering a double blow: one from falls in stock markets and another dealt by increasing longevity. This ultimately is said to have transformed the pensions industry from being in surplus in the past to being in deficit in the present and putting more financial pressure on trustees to be more short-term in future. Quotes 12 and 13 are suggestive of this narrative. Interviewees suggest that pension fund deficits have contributed significantly to the shrinkage of pension fund investment horizons.
Ultimately, most trustees and pension fund managers were 'worried about what is
going to happen to pensions in the next three months'. As a consequence, they said they had to focus more on investment performance of their asset portfolio over the short term, rather than long-term engagement with equity investments. Increasing complexity of financial products and structures. Interviewees' accounts also evoked an impression of increasing complexity and volatility in the pensions industry: an increasing range of investment products available, larger number of managers to offer and manage these products, and the associated multiplicity of fund manager mandates. All of these were said to further detach pension fuds from their 22 investee corporations. Quotes 16, 17 and 18 illustrate these accounts. Many pension funds in this group had over 40 investment mandates, sometimes over a hundred.
Over time, these increases in mandates is said to become too much for the existing governance structures of pension funds, which makes it difficult to monitor what the fund managers deliver.
The complexity of investment products is also accompanied with the complexity of investment contracts attached to those products and a sophisticated jargon, which trustees often did not understand as it 'wasn't in the discussions that trustees had years ago'. Such complexity of pension fund investment is said to have had huge implications for pension fund investment strategy, causing trustees to focus on shortterm investment returns within investment mandates. The focus on investment performance and funds' 'exit' strategy is best summarised in Quote 19.
Increasing complexity in regulation.
Interviewees also highlighted an increasing burden of regulation over time, which has put more responsibilities on trustees, creating 'a culture of box-ticking' that was 'gradually replacing professionalism'.
According to pensions practitioners, 'every time there is a crisis, people say that the
answer is more regulation, more detail and more boxes to tick'; this type of mentality meant that trustees found it 'difficult to see the big picture because they are overwhelmed by all the detail'. Quotes 20, 21 and 22 illustrate this perspective.
Group B Engagement Vocabulary
In contrast to group A, very few interviewees (represented only by two large occupational pension funds and pension funds within the Local Authority Pension
Fund Forum) used a more positive vocabulary about engagement. issues for the greater good of society (Quotes 24).
Internal Accounts
Resources and Expertise.
Interviewees also suggested that the size of a fund, its internal resources and the level of expertise on the trustee board play a crucial role in enabling engagement activities. The more resources and expertise a fund has inhouse, the more control it has over the formulation and implementation of its investment strategies. Coupled with the internal 'ethos' of stewardship, these characteristics were said to have allowed trustees to exercise their fiduciary duty and act in the best long-term interests of their members in a more 'responsible' way.
Quote 25 captures this perception. We also note here that smaller and less resourced local authority schemes 'pulled their resources together' and engaged via LAPFF. and was embedded in the investment philosophy and connected to the overall investment decision-making process.
External Accounts
Temporal Perspective
In contrast to disengaged vocabulary we find that trustees and pensions executives within this group talk about past, present and future in a more positive way.
Respondents described gradual pension industry changes from non-engagement in the past to more active and meaningful engagement by some pension funds in the present and ultimately connecting this to a more sustainable future. Interviewees suggested that there is more attention not only to pension fund governance within the industry, but also more responsibility around investment stewardship, which was a result of increased public pressure to take ESG issues more seriously (Quotes 27, 28 and 29).
Trustees and pensions executives also reflected on the positive changes in the pension fund industry, by saying that the Pensions' Regulator provided a wealth of information which allowed trustees to become 'more professional' and 'more knowledgeable' about investment and stewardship. 
Discussion
The aim of this research was to shed new light on pension fund investment strategies and the approaches to equity ownership. More specifically, how pension fund practitioners talk about engagement and disengagement vis-à-vis investee corporations over time. We used theorizations about time (Bluedorn and Standfier, 2006; Slawinski and Bansal, 2012) and the notions of vocabularies of motive (Mills, 1940; Weick, 1969; Whittle and Mueller, 2015) , as a novel cross-disciplinary lens to shed light on pension fund investment strategies. Methodologically we moved away from the hard laws of economic behaviour and the dichotomous principal/agent view of investor/company relationship towards more soft and qualitative assumptions which take into account the often messy, fluid and complex view of social organization. We also viewed pension funds as one distinct type of investor to account for investor heterogeneity (Ryan & Schneider, 2003; Koh, 2007; Connelly, et. al. 2010 ).
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Empirically, our findings offer novel qualitative insights into the vocabularies and temporal perspectives that trustees and pension fund managers use to account for their investment behaviour. We extend the very few and mostly quantitative studies on pension funds in relation to corporate governance. Looking at what economic sociologists would call 'the blind spot', we particularly provide further evidence to support ongoing scholarly concerns about pension fund willingness and ability to act as engaged owners (Webb, et. al. 2003; Hellman, 2005; Kahan and Rock, 2007; Conyon and Sadler, 2010) .
More specifically, while the most recent qualitative study by Tilba and McNulty (2013) associate UK pension fund disengagement with the complexity within the investment chain and a subsequent disconnect in accountability relationships alongside it, we find that this picture is much more complex. By using the examples of pension fund engagement and disengagement, we reveal the existence of different accounts and vocabularies of motive within pension fund investment practices. These vocabularies of motive are durable and also accompanied with distinctly different temporal perspectives. We term these as 'engaged' and 'disengaged' vocabulary, which included a range of external and internal accounts Similarly, trustees in group A linked external socio-economic factors such as unstable financial markets, increasing longevity and progressing pension fund maturity with increased pension fund deficits and liabilities -all factors which respondents claim to have diminished pension fund capacity to engage with investee corporations. Although engaging pension funds' respondents all mentioned these factors, they did not consider them to be a barrier to engagement. Instead, they were talking about increasing public pressure on accountability, which has often prompted more engagement actions.
We also find that disengaged and engaged vocabularies or 'scripts' are contextualized within different temporal perspectives. Pension fund practitioners who used a disengaged vocabulary had a more negative perception of the present in comparison to the past, which was connected to short-term future uncertainty.
Trustees and executives were describing a transition from pension's surpluses into deficits, an increasing trend towards outsourcing, and increased complexity of financial products and structures, which was detaching trustees too far from investee companies. Furthermore, a burden of over-regulation was said to create a culture of box-ticking rather than meaningful engagement.
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In contrast, engaged vocabulary consisted of a narrative of positive gradual changes in the industry over time, which was associated to a longer-term and sustainable future. Interestingly, the temporal perspective within disengaged vocabulary suggests a discord between the long-term investment horizon of pension funds and the need to provide a pension which is sustainable in future on the one hand and a short-term and more 'immediate' financial pressures in the present. Within such a temporal perspective, engagement was also often described as a trend in time.
Theoretically, our findings support the growing body of qualitative governance research, which highlight the need to attend to the practices, meanings and motives that underpin investment management by institutions (Hendry, et. al.'s, 2004; 2006; 2007, Tilba and McNulty, 2013) . Our empirical insights into pension fund vocabularies highlight the significance of different narratives and also help develop a more coherent understanding of how vocabularies work (Loewenstein, et. al, 2012) . Furthermore, our analysis of temporal perspectives adds to an embryonic stream within corporate governance research which examines a multi-faceted view of time in relation to ESG issues like climate change (Slawinski and Bansal, 2012) .Our findings also support their claim that variability of interpretation of time can shed more light on the variance in organizational behaviour.
Significantly, we suggest that the tension between discourse and action in this study may represent not simply the individual motivations of fund managers, but rather are expressions of extant norms in the broader social context of financial markets. We believe that these contrasting accounts and the associated engagement or disengagement actions may be an example of organisational enactment through coproduction of vocabularies of motive, which is consistent with Weick's (1969) theory.
The systematic and self-reinforcing processes are something that Aspara, et. al. (2014) 29 and Whittle and Mueller (2015) have been recently investigating in relation to investors, the media and the banks.
Our study provides some initial evidence to suggest that engagement or disengagement actions may be a product of accounts, often constructed in unnoticed ways through the choice of internal and external, rational or irrational, explanations and justifications of behavior. What is clear from our study is that a great deal rests on which accounts of action become embedded in the 'repertoire of legitimate stories' (Czarniawaska, 1997; 16) . In other words, the dominant repertoires/vocabularies can provide the dominant patterns of sense-making and reasoning that may inform action, creating the very conditions they describe.
Our findings support the view that 'vocabulary of motives' are rooted in the culturally and situationally approriate 'scripts' that are available in a particular social group in a particular historical period of time. We find that these repertoires of stories are embedded within different temporal perspectives, which support the Bluedorn and
Standfier's (2006) view of time as socially constructed. Significantly, our findings provide some indication that disengaged vocabulary appears to be if not a conduit that drives action, but certainly a conduit that can permit disengagement and short-term behaviour. Therefore, a fresh research agenda should focus on establishing whether this causal relationship exists. This agenda is of particular importance given the UK policymakers' interest in understanding pension fund trustee behavioural dynamics (FCA, 2016; Tilba, et. al. 2016 ).
Policy Implications
Both academics and policy makers have focused on shareholder value and the role of shareholders, with many attempts made to facilitate further engagement and 30 stewardship between shareholders and management. We find this focus to be misconceived, preferring to claim that trustees' accounts of their fiduciary role within the trust relationship contradict in practice the logic of engagement because many trustees equate beneficiaries' interests to financial interests and maximizing investment returns. This is also reflected in the contractual relationships with their investment fund managers and their mandates, which we argue actually discourages the investment fund managers from conducting stewardship activities. An important policy implication is that perceived realities of investment are unlikely to cause a change in pension fund behaviour because participants' accounts of their investment practice seem to decouple their view of the world from their impact on the world.
Limitations and Future Research
Our study has limitations. The qualitative character of this research means that we might never move beyond subjective 'mere rationalizations' to 'real motives' and 'uses of time'; multiple others factors may also play a part in self-reinforcing behaviors. We also did not specifically set out to investigate the human perception of time. However, we believe that understanding the espoused vocabularies of motives and their enactment through time is important because it can be transferred to other contexts and organisations. For example, how do investment consultants make sense and account for their practices? We argue that these 'vocabularies' and 'time perspectives' in themselves need to be treated as an object of study within management and corporate governance research. It would be intersecting to explore this in more detail in future, as well as the linguistic behaviour of interviewees using Mills' (1940) theory of language and sociological psychology. In this study we had access to what we consider to be 'key informants' in the pensions field who have allowed us to theorize about pension fund behaviour vis-à-vis equity investments.
Future inquiry should test the wider representativeness of these assumptions.
Appendix A Data Collection
Phase 1 Using the sorting tools in the Pension Funds Online database, 2,866 UK pension funds were identified by their share of UK ownership, starting from the minimum value of £1 million + ∞.
The population range is generated according to fund size in terms of capital value, the highest being over £37 billion and the lowest being just over £2 million. From this list, Top 100 occupational and local authority pension funds were then selected for the second screening phase.
Phase 2 The Top 100 pension funds were analyzed and cross-compared, to establish the characteristics such as pension fund type, amount of assets under management, allocation to equity, mode of investment management, and maturity.
After examining these characteristics it became evident that there was enough diversity within these funds to reflect the different characteristics and the completeness of the range of the responses. The sample represents both local authority and occupational pension funds, with assets under management ranging from £30 billion to just under £1 billion, and total membership ranging from 239,144 to just over 10,000. 
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Appendix B List of Respondents
